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On the Vulnerability of CNN Classifiers
in EEG-Based BCIs
Xiao Zhang and Dongrui Wu
Abstract—Deep learning has been successfully used in numer-
ous applications because of its outstanding performance and the
ability to avoid manual feature engineering. One such application
is electroencephalogram (EEG) based brain-computer interface
(BCI), where multiple convolutional neural network (CNN)
models have been proposed for EEG classification. However, it
has been found that deep learning models can be easily fooled
with adversarial examples, which are normal examples with small
deliberate perturbations. This paper proposes an unsupervised
fast gradient sign method (UFGSM) to attack three popular
CNN classifiers in BCIs, and demonstrates its effectiveness. We
also verify the transferability of adversarial examples in BCIs,
which means we can perform attacks even without knowing the
architecture and parameters of the target models, or the datasets
they were trained on. To our knowledge, this is the first study on
the vulnerability of CNN classifiers in EEG-based BCIs, and
hopefully will trigger more attention on the security of BCI
systems.
Index Terms—Electroencephalogram, brain-computer inter-
faces, convolutional neural networks, adversarial examples
I. INTRODUCTION
A brain-computer interface (BCI) is a communication path-
way between the human brain and a computer [13]. Electroen-
cephalogram (EEG), which measures the brain signal from the
scalp, is the most widely used input signal in BCIs, due to its
simplicity and low cost [25]. There are different paradigms in
using EEG signals in BCIs, e.g., P300 evoked potentials [10],
[33], [40], [43], motor imagery (MI) [29], steady-state visual
evoked potential (SSVEP) [47], drowsiness/reaction time esti-
mation [41], [42], [44], etc.
As shown in Fig. 1, a BCI system usually consists of
four parts: signal acquisition, signal preprocessing, machine
learning, and control action. The machine learning block usu-
ally includes feature extraction and classification/regression if
traditional machine learning algorithms are applied. However,
feature extraction and classification/regression can also be
seamlessly integrated into a single deep learning model.
Deep learning has achieved state-of-the-art performance in
various applications, without the need of manual feature ex-
traction. Recently, multiple deep learning models, particularly
those based on convolutional neural networks (CNNs), have
also been proposed for EEG classification in BCIs. Lawhern
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Fig. 1. The procedure of a BCI system when traditional machine learning
algorithms are used. Manual feature extraction is not necessary if deep
learning is employed.
et al. (2016) [19] proposed EEGNet, which demonstrated out-
standing performance in several BCI applications. Schirrmeis-
ter et al. (2017) [31] designed a deep CNN model (DeepCNN)
and a shallow CNN model (ShallowCNN) to perform end-to-
end EEG decoding. There were also some works converting
EEG signals to images and then classifying them with deep
learning models [4], [35], [37]. This paper focuses on the CNN
models that accept the raw EEG signal as the input, more
specifically, EEGNet, DeepCNN, and ShallowCNN. A CNN
model using the spectrogram as the input is briefly discussed
in Section III-J.
Albeit their outstanding performance, deep learning models
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In such attacks, delib-
erately designed small perturbations, many of which may be
hard to notice even by human, are added to normal examples
to fool the deep learning model and cause dramatic perfor-
mance degradation. This phenomena was first investigated by
Szegedy et al. in 2013 [34] and soon received great attention.
Goodfellow et al. (2014) [12] successfully confused a deep
learning model to misclassify a panda into a gibbon. Kurakin
et al. (2016) [18] found that deep learning systems might
even make mistakes on printed photos of adversarial examples.
Brown et al. (2017) [6] made an adversarial patch which was
able to confuse deep learning models when attached on a pic-
ture. Athalye et al. (2017) [2] built an adversarial 3D-printed
turtle which was classified as a riffle at every viewpoint with
randomly sampled poses. Additionally, adversarial examples
have also been used to attack speech recognition systems, e.g.,
a piece of speech, which is almost the same as a normal one
but with a small adversarial perturbation, could be transcribed
into any phrase the attacker chooses [8].
Adversarial examples could significantly damage deep
learning models, which have been an indispensable compo-
nent in computer vision, automatic driving, natural language
processing, speech recognition, etc. To our knowledge, the
2vulnerability of deep learning models in EEG-based BCIs
has not been investigated yet, but it is critical and urgent.
For example, EEG-based BCIs could be used to control
wheelchairs or exoskeleton for the disabled [20], where ad-
versarial attacks could make the wheelchair or exoskeleton
malfunction. The consequence could range from merely user
confusion and frustration, to significantly reducing the user’s
quality of life, and even to hurting the user by driving him/her
into danger on purpose. In clinical applications of BCIs in
awareness evaluation/detection for disorder of consciousness
patients [20], adversarial attacks could lead to misdiagnosis.
According to how much the attacker can get access to the
target model, attacks can be categorized into three types:
1) White-box attacks, which assume that the attacker has
access to all information of the target model, including
its architecture and parameters. Most of the white-box
attacks are based on some optimization strategies or gra-
dient strategies, such as L-BFGS [34], DeepFool [24],
the C&W method [7], the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [12], the basic iterative method [18], etc.
2) Black-box attacks, which assume the attacker knows
neither the architecture nor the parameters of the target
model, but can observe its responses to inputs. Papernot
et al. (2016) [27] developed a black-box attack approach
which can be used to generate adversarial examples by
interacting with the target model and training a substitute
model. Su et al. (2017) [32] successfully fooled three
different models by changing just one pixel of an image.
Brendel et al. (2017) [5] proposed a black-box attack
approach that starts from a large adversarial perturbation
and then tries to reduce the perturbation while staying
adversarial.
3) Gray-box attacks, which assume the attacker knows
some but not all information about the target model,
e.g., the training data that the target model is tuned on,
but not its architecture and parameters.
In order to better compare the application scenarios of
the three attack types, we summarize their characteristics in
Table I. ‘−’ means that whether the information is available or
not will not affect the attack strategy, since it will not be used
in the attack. It is clear that we need to know less and less
information about the target model when going from white-
box attack to gray-box attack and then to black-box attack.
This makes the attack more and more practical, but we would
also expect that knowing less information about the target
model may affect the attack performance. This paper considers
all three types of attacks in EEG-based BCIs.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE THREE ATTACK TYPES.
Target model information White-Box Gray-Box Black-Box
Know its architecture X × ×
Know its parameters θ X × ×
Know its training data − X ×
Can observe its response − − X
According to its purpose, an attack can also be regarded as
a target attack, which forces a model to classify an adversarial
example into a specific class, or a nontarget attack, which only
forces a model to misclassify the adversarial examples.
This paper aims at exploring the vulnerability of CNN
classifiers under nontarget adversarial examples in EEG-based
BCIs. We propose an attack framework which converts a
normal EEG epoch into an adversarial example by simply in-
jecting a jamming module before machine learning to perform
adversarial perturbation, as shown in Fig. 2. We then propose
an unsupervised fast gradient sign method (UFGSM), an
unsupervised version of FGSM [12], to design the adversarial
perturbation. The adversarial perturbation could be so weak
that it is hardly noticeable, as shown in Fig. 3, but can
effectively fool a CNN classifier. We consider three attack
scenarios – white-box attack, gray-box attack, and black-box
attack – separately. For each scenario, we provide the attack
strategy to craft adversarial examples, and the corresponding
experimental results. We show that our approaches can work
in most cases and can significantly reduce the classification
accuracy of the target model. To our knowledge, this is the
first study on the vulnerability of CNN classifiers in EEG-
based BCIs. It exposes an important security problem in BCI,
and hopefully will lead to the design of safer BCIs.
Fig. 2. Our proposed attack framework: inject a jamming module between
signal preprocessing and machine learning to generate adversarial examples.
Fig. 3. A normal EEG epoch and its adversarial example. The two inputs
could be classified into different classes, although they are almost identical.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II proposes the strategies we use to attack the CNN
classifiers. Section III presents the details of the experiments
and the results on white-box attack, gray-box attack, and
black-box attack. Section IV draws conclusion and points out
some future research directions.
II. STRATEGIES TO ATTACK BCI SYSTEMS
This section introduces our strategies to attack EEG-based
BCI systems when CNN is used as the classifier. We assume
the attacker is able to invade a BCI system and inject a
jamming module between signal preprocessing and machine
learning, as shown in Fig. 2. This is possible in practice, as
many BCI systems transmit preprocessed EEG signals to a
3computer, a smart phone, or the cloud, for feature extrac-
tion and classification/regression. The attacker could attach
the jamming module to the EEG headset signal transmitter,
or to the receiver at the other side, to perform adversarial
perturbation.
The jamming module needs to satisfy two requirements: 1)
the adversarial perturbation it generates should be so small
that it is hardly detectable; and, 2) the adversarial example
can effectively fool the CNN classifier. We propose UFGSM
to construct it.
Let
xi =


xi(1, 1), · · · , xi(1, T )
...
. . .
...
xi(C, 1), · · · , xi(C, T )

 (1)
be the i-th raw EEG epoch, where C is the number of EEG
channels and T the number of the time domain samples. Let yi
be the true class label associated with xi, f(xi) the mapping
from xi to yi used in the target CNN model, x˜i = g(xi) the
adversarial perturbation generated by the jamming module g.
Then, g needs to satisfy:
|x˜i(c, t)− xi(c, t)| 6 ǫ, ∀c ∈ [1, C], t ∈ [1, T ] (2)
f(x˜i) 6= yi (3)
Equation (2) ensures that the perturbation is no larger than a
predefined threshold ǫ, and (3) requires the generated adver-
sarial example should be misclassified by the target model f .
Note that (2) must hold for every c ∈ [1, C] and t ∈ [1, T ],
but it may be impossible for every x˜i to satisfy (3), especially
when ǫ is small. We evaluate the performance of the jamming
module g by measuring the accuracy of the target model on
the adversarial examples. A lower accuracy of the target model
under adversarial attack indicates a better performance of the
jamming model g, i.e., the more xi satisfy (3), the better the
performance of g is.
Next we describe how we construct the jamming module
g. We first introduce FGSM, one of the most well-known ad-
versarial example generators, and then our proposed UFGSM,
which extends FGSM to unsupervised scenarios.
A. FGSM
FGSM was proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2014) [12] and
soon became a benchmark attack approach. Let f be the
target deep learning model, θ be its parameters, and J be
the loss function in training f . The main idea of FGSM is to
find an optimal max-norm perturbation η constrained by α to
maximize J . The perturbation can be calculated as:
η = α · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, yi)) (4)
And hence the jamming module g can be written as:
g(xi) = xi + α · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, yi)) (5)
The requirement in (2) holds as long as α ≤ ǫ.
Let α = ǫ so that we can perturb xi at the maximum extent.
Then, g can be re-expressed as:
g(xi) = xi + ǫ · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, yi)) (6)
FGSM is an effective attack approach since it only requires
calculating the gradients once instead of multiple times such
as in the basic iterative method [18].
B. White-Box Attack
In a white-box attack, the attacker knows the architecture
and parameters θ of the target model f . It may represent
the scenario that a BCI system designer wants to evaluate
the worst case performance of the system under attack, since
usually white-box attacks cause more damages to the classifier
than gray-box or black-box attacks. The designer then uses
all information he/she knows about the classifier to attack it.
It may also represent scenarios that the target model of a
BCI system is somehow leaked/hacked, or the target model
is publicly available.
Knowing the architecture and parameters θ of the target
model f is not enough for FGSM, because it needs to know
the true label yi of xi in order to generate the adversarial per-
turbation. Next we propose UFGSM, an unsupervised FGSM,
to cope with this problem.
UFGSM replaces the label yi by y
′
i
= f(xi), i.e., the
estimated label from the target model. Consequently, g in
UFGSM can be rewritten as:
g(xi) = xi + ǫ · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, y
′
i)) (7)
y′
i
approaches yi when the accuracy of f is high, and hence the
performance of UFGSM approaches FGSM. However, as will
be demonstrated in the next section, our proposed UFGSM is
still effective even when y′i is quite different from yi.
The pseudocode of our proposed UFGSM for white-box
attacks is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Our proposed UFGSM for white-box at-
tacks.
Input: f , the target model; θ, the parameters of f ; J ,
loss function of the target model; ǫ, the upper
bound of perturbation; xi, a normal EEG epoch.
Output: x˜i, an adversarial EEG epoch.
Calculate y′i = f(xi);
Calculate x˜i = xi + ǫ · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, y
′
i
)).
return x˜i
C. Gray-Box Attack
UFGSM does not need the true labels when generating
adversarial examples, but it assumes that we know the pa-
rameters of the target model f , which is still challenging in
practice. This requirement can be eliminated by utilizing the
transferability of adversarial examples, which is the basis of
both gray-box and black-box attacks.
The transferability of adversarial examples was first ob-
served by Szegedy et al. (2013) [34], which may be the
most dangerous property of adversarial examples. It denotes
an intriguing phenomenon that adversarial examples generated
4by one deep learning model can also, with high probability,
fool another model even the two models are different. This
property has been used to attack deep learning models, e.g.,
Papernot et al. (2016) [27] attacked deep learning systems by
training a substitute model with only queried information.
To better secure deep learning systems, a lot of studies
have been done to understand the transferability of adversarial
examples. Papernot et al. (2016) [28], Liu et al. (2016) [21]
and Tramer et al. (2017) [39] all attributed this property to
some kind of similarity between the models. However, Wu
et al. (2018) [45] questioned these explanations since they
found that the transferability of adversarial examples is not
symmetric, which does not satisfy the definition of similarity.
Although more theoretical research is needed to understand
both the adversarial example and its transferability property,
this does not hinder us from using them in gray-box attack.
Assume we have access to the training dataset used to con-
struct the target model f , e.g., we know that f was trained
using some public databases. The basic idea of gray-box attack
is to train our own model f ′ to replace the target model f in
UFGSM, so that we can get rid of the dependency on the
target model f .
The pseudocode of UFGSM for gray-box attacks is shown
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Our proposed UFGSM for gray-box attacks.
Input: D, training data of the target model; J , loss
function of the substitute model; ǫ, the upper
bound of perturbation; xi, a normal EEG epoch.
Output: x˜i, an adversarial EEG epoch.
Train a substitute model f ′ from D, using loss function
J ;
Calculate y′
i
= f ′(xi);
Calculate x˜i = xi + ǫ · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, y
′
i)), where θ
encodes the parameters of f ′.
return x˜i
D. Black-Box Attack
Gray-box attack assumes the attacker has access to the train-
ing data of the target model, e.g., the target model is trained
on some classic public datasets. An even more challenging
situation is black-box attack, in which the attacker has access
to neither the parameters of the target model nor its training
data. Instead, the attacker can only interact with the target
model and observe its output for an input. One example is to
attack a commercial proprietary EEG-based BCI system. The
attacker can buy such a system and observe its responses, but
does not have access to the parameters or the training data of
the target model.
Papernot et al. [27] proposed an approach to perform
black-box attacks. A similar idea is used in this paper. We
record the inputs and outputs of the target model to train a
substitute model f ′, which is then used in UFGSM to generate
adversarial examples, as shown in Algorithm 3. Note that the
way we augment the training set is different from the original
one in [27]. In [27], the new training set was constructed by
calculating the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the labels
assigned to the inputs, whereas we use the loss computed from
the inputs instead.
Algorithm 3: Our proposed UFGSM for black-box at-
tacks.
Input: f , the target model; J , loss function of the
substitute model; λ, the parameter to control the
step to generate the new training dataset; N , the
maximum number of iterations; ǫ, the upper
bound of perturbation; xi, a normal EEG epoch.
Output: x˜i, an adversarial EEG epoch.
Construct a set of unlabeled EEG epochs S;
Pass S through f to generate a training dataset D;
Train a substitute model f ′ from D, using loss function
J ;
for n = 1 to N do
∆S = {x+ λ · sign(∇xJ(θ,x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ D},
where θ encodes the parameters of f ′;
∆D = {(xi, f(xi))}xi∈∆S ;
D ← D
⋃
∆D;
Train a substitute model f ′ from D, using loss
function J ;
end
Calculate y′
i
= f ′(xi);
Calculate x˜i = xi + ǫ · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, y
′
i)), where θ
encodes the parameters of f ′.
return x˜i
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section validates the performances of the three attack
strategies. Three EEG datasets and three CNN models were
used.
A. The Three EEG Datasets
The following three EEG datasets were used in our experi-
ments:
1) P300 evoked potentials (P300): The P300 dataset for
binary-classification, collected from four disabled subjects
and four healthy ones, was first introduced in [15]. In the
experiment, a subjects faced a laptop on which six images
were flashed randomly to elicit P300 responses. The goal was
to classify whether the image is target or non-target. The EEG
data were recorded from 32 channels at 2048Hz. We bandpass
filtered the data to 1-40Hz and downsampled them to 256Hz.
Then we extracted EEG epochs in [0,1]s after each image
onset, normalized them using
x−mean(x)
10 , and truncated the
resulting values into [-5, 5], as the input to the CNN classifiers.
Each subject had about 3,300 epochs.
52) Feedback error-related negativity (ERN): The ERN
dataset [23] was used in a Kaggle competition1 for two-class
classification. It was collected from 26 subjects and partitioned
into training set (16 subjects) and test set (10 subjects). We
only used the 16 subjects in the training set as we do not
have access to the test set. The 56-channel EEG data had been
downsampled to 200Hz. We bandpass filtered them to 1-40Hz,
extracted EEG epochs between [0,1.3]s, and standardized them
using z-score normalization. Each subject had 340 epochs.
3) Motor imagery (MI): The MI dataset is Dataset 2A2 in
BCI Competition IV [36]. It was collected from nine subjects
and consisted of four classes (imagined movements of the
left hand, right hand, feet, and tongue). The 22-channel EEG
signals were sampled at 128Hz. As in [19], we bandpass
filtered the data to 4-40Hz, and standardized them using an
exponential moving average window with a decay factor of
0.999. Each subject had 576 epochs, 144 in each class.
B. The Three CNN Models
The following three different CNN models were used in our
experiments:
1) EEGNet: EEGNet [19] is a compact CNN architecture
with only about 1000 parameters (the number may change
slightly according to the nature of the task). EEGNet contains
an input block, two convolutional blocks and a classifica-
tion block. To reduce the number of model parameters, it
replaces the traditional convolution operation with a depthwise
separable convolution, which is the most important block in
Xception [9].
2) DeepCNN: Compared with EEGNet, DeepCNN [31] is
deeper and hence has much more parameters. It consists of
four convolutional blocks and a classification block. The first
convolutional block is specially designed to handle EEG inputs
and the other three are standard ones.
3) ShallowCNN: ShallowCNN [31] is a shallow version of
DeepCNN, inspired by filter bank common spatial patterns [1].
Its first block is similar to the first convolutional block of
DeepCNN, but with a larger kernel, a different activation
function, and a different pooling approach.
C. Training Procedure and Performance Measures
The first two datasets have high class imbalance. To ac-
commodate this, in training we applied a weight to each class,
which was the inverse of its number of examples in the training
set. We used the Adam optimizer [16], and cross entropy as our
loss function. Early stopping was used to reduce overfitting.
The test set still had class imbalance, which resembled the
practical application scenario. We employed two metrics to
evaluate the test performance:
1) Raw classification accuracy (RCA), which is the ratio
of the total number of correctly classified test examples
to the total number of test examples.
2) Balanced classification accuracy (BCA) [40], which is
the average of the individual RCAs of different classes.
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/inria-bci-challenge
2http://www.bbci.de/competition/iv/
D. Baseline Performances on Clean EEG Data
We first evaluated the baseline performances of the three
CNN models.
Within-subject experiments – For each individual subject,
epochs were shuffled and divided into 80% training and
20% test. We further randomly sampled 25% epochs from
the training set as our validation set in early stopping. We
calculated the mean RCAs and BCAs from all subjects as the
performance measures.
Cross-subject experiments – For each dataset, leave-one-
subject-out cross-validation was performed, and the mean
RCAs and BCAs were calculated. Epochs from all subjects
in the training set were mixed, shuffled, and divided into 75%
training and 25% validation.
The baseline results are shown in Fig. 4 and Table II,
and the corresponding models were regarded as our target
models. Note that the RCAs and BCAs on the MI dataset were
considerably lower, because MI was 4-class classification,
whereas P300 and ERN were 2-class classification. For all
datasets and all classifiers, RCAs and BCAs of within-class
experiments were higher than their counterparts in cross-
subject experiments, which is reasonable, because individual
differences cause inconsistency among examples from differ-
ent subjects.
P300 ERN MI
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
RC
A
Within subject, EEGNet
Within subject, DeepCNN
Within subject, ShallowCNN
Cross subject, EEGNet
Cross subject, DeepCNN
Cross subject, ShallowCNN
(a)
P300 ERN MI
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
BC
A
Within subject, EEGNet
Within subject, DeepCNN
Within subject, ShallowCNN
Cross subject, EEGNet
Cross subject, DeepCNN
Cross subject, ShallowCNN
(b)
Fig. 4. Baseline classification accuracies of the three CNN classifiers on
different datasets. (a) RCAs; (b) BCAs.
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RCAS/BCAS OF DIFFERENT CNN CLASSIFIERS IN WHITE-BOX AND GRAY-BOX ATTACKS ON THE THREE DATASETS (ǫ = 0.1/0.1/0.05 FOR
P300/ERN/MI).
Experimental Setup Dataset Target Model f
Baselines White-Box Substitute Model f ′ in Gray-Box Attack
Clean Data Noisy Data Attack EEGNet DeepCNN ShallowCNN
Within-Subject
P300
EEGNet .8168/.7915 .8156/.7896 .1947/.2204 .2342/.2486 .2832/.3017 .6753/.6538
DeepCNN .8371/.8049 .8350/.8006 .2047/.2276 .3865/.3717 .3065/.3118 .7110/.6730
ShallowCNN .8243/.7668 .8264/.7623 .1868/.2420 .6764/.6178 .6388/.5889 .3238/.3335
ERN
EEGNet .7702/.7513 .7693/.7435 .2353/.2519 .4283/.4070 .5377/.5268 .6994/.6697
DeepCNN .7224/.7100 .7233/.7113 .3539/.3549 .5864/.5689 .5294/.4983 .6719/.6483
ShallowCNN .7077/.6589 .7068/.6577 .3162/.3450 .6811/.6279 .6535/.6062 .4770/.4855
MI
EEGNet .6705/.6698 .6552/.6551 .1561/.1570 .2337/.2312 .4684/.4759 .3554/.3593
DeepCNN .5316/.5316 .5250/.5248 .2586/.2609 .5067/.5067 .3736/.3803 .3554/.3589
ShallowCNN .7519/.7505 .7213/.7212 .1705/.1728 .6130/.6179 .5575/.5636 .2289/.2296
Cross-Subject
P300
EEGNet .6985/.6306 .6978/.6295 .3085/.3786 .3635/.4092 .4666/.4729 .5351/.5308
DeepCNN .6992/.6366 .6982/.6345 .3095/.3666 .4096/.4500 .3739/.4115 .4711/.4882
ShallowCNN .6659/.6225 .6660/.6230 .3346/.3783 .4429/.4799 .4439/.4694 .3509/.4013
ERN
EEGNet .6250/.6266 .6272/.6309 .3904/.3823 .3561/.3917 .3263/.3533 .5241/.5455
DeepCNN .6719/.6404 .6792/.6434 .3281/.3595 .3450/.3897 .3254/.3464 .5379/.5186
ShallowCNN .6754/.6394 .6783/.6391 .3246/.3606 .5555/.5533 .5438/.5125 .3379/.3702
MI
EEGNet .4500/.4500 .4460/.4460 .2369/.2369 .2531/.2531 .2834/.2834 .2785/.2785
DeepCNN .4695/.4695 .4655/.4655 .2550/.2550 .3536/.3536 .2865/.2865 .2948/.2948
ShallowCNN .4734/.4734 .4660/.4660 .2610/.2610 .3520/.3520 .3009/.3009 .2658/.2658
E. Baseline Performances under Random Noise
Before attacking these three target models using our pro-
posed approaches, we corrupted the clean EEG data with
random noise η0 to check if that can significantly deteriorate
the classification performances. If so, then we do not need
to use a sophisticated approach to construct the adversarial
examples: just adding random noise is enough.
The random noise was designed to be:
η0 = ǫ · sign (N (0, 1)) (8)
i.e., η0 is either −ǫ or ǫ, so that its amplitude resembles that
of the adversarial perturbations in (2). Although the EEG in
all three datasets had similar standard deviations, empirically
we found that the CNN classifiers trained on the MI dataset
were more sensitive to noise than those on P300 or ERN. So,
we set ǫ = 0.1 for P300 and ERN, and ǫ = 0.05 for MI in
the experiments.
The results are shown in Table II. The classification ac-
curacies on the noisy EEG data were comparable with, and
sometimes even slightly better than, those on the clean EEG
data, suggesting that adding random noise did not have a
significant influence on the target models. In other words,
adversarial perturbations cannot be implemented by simple
random noise; instead, they must be deliberately designed.
F. White-Box Attack Performance
In a white-box attack, we know the target model exactly,
including its architecture and parameters. Then, we can use
UFGSM in Algorithm 1 to attack the target model. The
results are shown in Table II. Clearly, there were significant
performance deteriorations in all cases, and in most cases
the classification accuracies after attack were even lower than
random guess. Interestingly, though UFGSM is based on the
assumption that the target model should have high accuracy
so that we can replace the true class labels with the predicted
ones, Table II shows that significant damages could also be
made even when the target model has low accuracy, e.g., on
the MI dataset.
An example of the EEG epoch before and after adversarial
perturbation is shown in Fig. 5. The perturbation was so small
that it is barely visible, and hence difficult to detect.
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
time (s)
channel 0
channel 1
channel 2
channel 3
channel 4
channel 5
channel 6
channel 7
channel 8
channel 9
Adversarial Example
Original Example
Fig. 5. An example of the EEG epoch before and after adversarial perturbation
(MI dataset). ǫ = 0.05.
In summary, our results showed that the three CNN classi-
fiers can all be easily fooled with tiny adversarial perturbations
generated by the proposed UFGSM in Algorithm 1, when the
attacker has full knowledge of the target model.
ǫ = 0.1 for P300/ERN and ǫ = 0.05 for MI were used in
the above experiments. Since ǫ is an important parameter in
Algorithm 1, we also evaluated the performance of white-box
attack with respect to different values of ǫ. The results are
shown in Fig. 6. In all cases, the post-attack accuracy first
decreased rapidly as ǫ increased, and then converged to a low
7value.
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Fig. 6. BCAs of the target model after within-subject white-box attack, with
respect to different ǫ. a) P300 dataset; b) ERN dataset; and, c) MI dataset.
G. Gray-Box Attack Performance
Gray-box attack considers a more practical scenario than
white-box attack: instead of knowing the architecture and
parameters of the target model, here we only know its training
data. In gray-box attack, we train a substitute model f ′ on
the same training data, and use it in Algorithm 2 to generate
adversarial examples. This subsection verifies the effectiveness
of gray-box attack. Again, we set ǫ = 0.1/0.1/0.05 for
P300/ERN/MI, respectively.
Assume the target model is EEGNet, but the attacker does
not know. The attacker randomly picks a model architecture,
e.g., DeepCNN, and trains it using the known training data.
This model then becomes the substitute model f ′ and is used in
Algorithm 2 to generate adversarial examples. When different
target models and different substitute models are used, the
attacking performances are shown in the last part of Table II
for the three datasets. We can observe that:
1) The RCAs and BCAs after gray-box attacks were lower
than the corresponding baseline accuracies, suggesting
the effectiveness of the proposed gray-box attack ap-
proach.
2) The RCAs and BCAs after gray-box attacks were gen-
erally higher than the corresponding accuracies after
white-box attacks, especially when the attacker did not
guess the architecture of the target model right, suggest-
ing that knowing more target model information (white-
box attack) can lead to more effective attacks.
3) In gray-box attacks, when the attacker guessed the right
architecture of the target model, the attack performance
was generally better than when he/she guessed the
wrong architecture.
H. Black-Box Attack Performance
This subsection considers a hasher but most practical sce-
nario: the attacker knows neither the parameters nor the
training set of the target model.
To simulate such a scenario, we partitioned 8/16/9 subjects
in the P300/ERN/MI dataset into two groups: 7/14/7 subjects
in Group A, and the remaining 1/2/2 in Group B. We assume
that the CNN classifier in the EEG-based BCI system was
trained on Group A. The attacker, who belongs to Group B,
bought such a system and would like to collect some data from
himself/herself, train a substitute model f ′ using Algorithm 3,
and then attack the CNN classifier. It’s important to note that
we used 80% epochs in Group A for training the target model
f (among which 75% were used for tuning the parameters,
and 25% for validation in early stopping), and the remaining
20% epochs in Group A for testing f and f ′. Before training
on the P300 and ERN datasets, to balance the classes of our
initial dataset, we randomly downsampled the majority class
according to the labels that the target model predicted at the
first time.
λ = 0.5 and N = 2 (Algorithm 3) were used in our
experiments. We only performed black-box attack on the
mixed epochs from all the subjects in the training set, since
it was too time-consuming to train cross-subject models or
within-subject model for each subject. The baseline and black-
box attack results are shown in Table III. Note that the baseline
results were slightly different from those in Table II, because
here we only used a subset of the subjects to train the baseline
models, whereas previously we used all subjects. After black-
box attack, the RCAs and BCAs of all target models decreased,
suggesting that our proposed black-box attack strategy was
effective. Generally, when the substitute model f ′ had the
same structure as the target model f , e.g., both were EEGNet,
the attack was most effective. This is intuitive.
8TABLE III
MIXED-SUBJECT RCAS/BCAS BEFORE AND AFTER BLACK-BOX ATTACK ON THE THREE DATASETS (ǫ = 0.1/0.1/0.05 FOR P300/ERN/MI).
Dataset Target Model f
Baselines Substitute Model f ′
Clean Noisy EEGNet DeepCNN ShallowCNN
EEGNet .7570/.7179 .7531/.7156 .3955/.4188 .5244/.5506 .5212/.5559
P300 DeepCNN .7713/.7404 .7747/.7430 .3957/.4081 .3589/.4297 .4617/.4806
ShallowCNN .7336/.7163 .7375/.7186 .6315/.6189 .5113/.5505 .4118/.4301
EEGNet .7665/.7614 .7687/.7640 .3113/.3288 .4893/.5024 .7207/.7006
ERN DeepCNN .7719/.7455 .7740/.7519 .3134/.3644 .3049/.3963 .6972/.7113
ShallowCNN .7495/.7399 .7367/.7238 .4478/.3860 .3977/.3906 .4691/.5715
EEGNet .5603/.5565 .5345/.5324 .2352/.2343 .2586/.2571 .3005/.2988
MI DeepCNN .5222/.5189 .5135/.5108 .4446/.4446 .4483/.4475 .4384/.4353
ShallowCNN .6201/.6201 .6133/.6128 .5394/.5411 .5062/.5045 .4433/.4466
I. Characteristics of the Perturbations
To better understand the characteristics of adversarial per-
turbations, this subsection studies the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) of the adversarial examples, and the spectrogram of
the perturbations.
We had no clue of the SNR of the normal epochs, so we
had to assume that they contained very little noise. To compute
the SNR of the noisy epochs [the random noise was generated
using (8)], we treated the normal epochs as the clean signals,
and the noise in (8) as the noise. To compute the SNR of
the adversarial examples, we treated the normal epochs as
the clean signals, and the adversarial perturbations as noise.
The SNRs are shown in Table IV. In all three datasets, the
SNRs of the noisy examples were roughly the same as those
in the adversarial examples, which is intuitive, since they
were controlled by the same parameter ǫ in our experiments.
With the same amount of noise, the deliberately generated
perturbations can significantly degrade the performances of
the CNN classifiers, whereas random noise cannot, suggesting
again the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms.
TABLE IV
SNRS (DB) OF NOISY EXAMPLES (NORMAL EXAMPLES PLUS RANDOM
NOISE) AND ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES. ǫ = 0.1/0.1/0.05 FOR
P300/ERN/MI.
Dataset Noisy examples
Adversarial examples
EEGNet DeepCNN ShallowCNN
P300 20.43 20.43 20.50 20.53
ERN 20.26 20.26 20.39 20.31
MI 25.50 25.50 25.57 25.60
Next we analyze the spectrogram of the adversarial exam-
ples. Consider within-subject white-box attacks on the P300
dataset. For each classifier we partitioned the misclassified ad-
versarial examples into two groups. Group 1 consisted of non-
target examples whose adversarial examples were classified
as targets, and Group 2 consisted of target examples whose
adversarial examples were classified as non-targets. We then
computed the spectrograms of all such examples using wavelet
decomposition, the mean spectrogram of each group, and the
difference of the two group means. The results are shown in
the first and third row of Fig. 7 for the three classifiers. They
were very similar to each other, in terms of their patterns and
ranges. We could observe a clear peak around 0.2s for all
three classifiers, maybe corresponding to the onset of P300
responses.
We then computed the mean spectrogram of the adversarial
perturbations. The results are shown in the second row of
Fig. 7 (note that their scales were much smaller than those
in the first row). The patterns and ranges are now noticeably
different. For EEGNet, the energy of the perturbations was
concentrated in a small region, i.e., [0, 0.8]s and [3, 5]Hz,
whereas that for DeepCNN was a little more scattered, and
that for ShallowCNN was almost uniformly distributed in the
entire time-frequency domain. These results suggest that the
perturbations from the three CNN classifiers had dramatically
different shapes, maybe specific to the characteristics of the
classifiers. They also explain the within-subject gray-box at-
tack results on the P300 dataset in Table II: the perturbations
generated from EEGNet and DeepCNN were similar, and
hence EEGNet (DeepCNN) as a substitute model could effec-
tively attack DeepCNN (EEGNet). However, the perturbations
generated from EEGNet/DeepCNN and ShallowCNN were
dramatically different, and hence EEGNet/DeepCNN were less
effective in attacking ShallowCNN, and vice versa.
J. Additional Attacks
To increase the robustness of a P300-based BCI system, a
CNN classifier may be applied to the synchronized average
of multiple epochs, instead of a single epoch. It’s interesting
to know if this averaging strategy can help defend adversarial
attacks.
As mentioned in Section III-A, the P300 dataset was
collected from eight subjects. Each subject completed four
recording sessions, and each session consisted of six runs,
one for each of the six images. The number of epochs of
each run was about 120 as each image was flashed about 20
times. We constructed an averaged epoch as the average of 10
epochs from the same image. Thus, two averaged epochs were
obtained from each image, and for each subject, 4×6×2 = 48
averaged target (P300) epochs were obtained. Similarly, we
obtained 248 averaged non-target epochs for each subject.
These epochs were shuffled and divided into 80% training and
20% test for each subject.
We then compared the following three white-box attacks
(ǫ = 0.1) in within-subject experiments:
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Fig. 7. Mean spectrogram of the normal examples (top row), mean spectrogram of the corresponding perturbations (middle row), and mean spectrogram
difference between target and non-target normal examples (bottom row), in within-subject white-box attack on the P300 dataset. Note that the scales are
different. The channel was randomly chosen. (a) EEGNet; (b) DeepCNN; and, (c) ShallowCNN.
1) Perturbation on each single epoch (PSE), in which an
adversarial example was generated for each single (un-
averaged) epoch, as shown in Fig. 8(a). This was also
the main attack considered before this subsection.
2) Averaged adversarial examples (AAE), in which an
adversarial example was generated for each of the 10
single epochs, as in PSE, and then their average was
taken, as shown in Fig. 8(b).
3) Perturbation on the averaged epochs (PAE), in which
an adversarial example was generated directly on each
averaged epoch, as shown in Fig. 8(c).
To better explore the transferability of adversarial examples,
we also tested a traditional approach3, xDAWN+RG, which
won the Kaggle BCI competition in 2015 and was also tested
in [19]. xDAWN+RG used xDAWN spatial filtering [30], Rie-
mannian geometry [3] and ElasticNet to classify the epochs.
We attacked it using PAE adversarial examples generated by
different CNN models.
3https://github.com/alexandrebarachant/bci-challenge-ner-2015
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8. Three approaches to generate adversarial examples on the
synchronized-averaging epochs. (a) PSE (no average); (b) AAE (attack, then
average); and, (c) PAE (average, then attack).
The results are shown in Table V4. All four approaches
4The baseline single epoch attack results were different from those in
Table II, especially for ShallowCNN, because here the CNN classifiers were
trained on the averaged epochs, and then applied to the single epochs, whereas
in Table II the CNN classifiers were trained directly on the single epochs.
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TABLE V
WITHIN-SUBJECT RCAS/BCAS BEFORE AND AFTER WHITE-BOX ATTACKS ON THE AVERAGED P300 EPOCHS. ǫ = 0.1.
models
Baseline Adversarial examples
Single Noisy Average Noisy PSE AAE PAE
EEGNet .7824/.7184 .7818/.7200 .9569/.9677 .9461/.9443 .1272/.2441 .2459/.3001 .0431/.0323
DeepCNN .7725/.7375 .7712/.7383 .9332/.9265 .9224/.9202 .2371/.3494 .3169/.3329 .0819/.0826
ShallowCNN .2477/.5291 .2417/.5273 .8685/.8393 .8556/.8357 .8491/.6147 .5465/.5421 .1315/.1607
Attacked by EEGNet .7931/.6417
xDAWN+RG .8145/.5697 .8000/.5654 .9569/.8934 .9289/.7775 Attacked by DeepCNN .7177/.5501
Attacked by ShallowCNN .8664/.6964
had improved performance when trained and tested on the
averaged epochs, suggesting the rationale to take the syn-
chronized average (of course, this also has the side effect of
reducing the speed of the BCI system). For each CNN model,
all three attack approaches were effective, but the attack was
most effective when the adversarial examples were generated
on the averaged epochs (i.e., PAE). The second part of Table V
shows that adversarial examples generated by CNN models
could be used to attack xDAWN+RG, but not as effective as
in attacking the CNN models. However, this does not mean
that traditional machine learning approaches are example from
adversarial attacks [26]. They may require different attack
strategies.
In all previous experiments we used raw EEG signals as
the input to the CNN models. However, the spectrograms
are also frequently used in MI based BCIs. Next, we study
whether our attack strategies can still work for the spectrogram
input. The CNN classification pipeline is shown in Fig. 9,
where common spatial pattern (CSP) filtering [17] was used
to reduce the number of EEG channels from 22 to 8, short-
time Fourier transform (STFT) was used to convert EEG
signals into spectrograms, and PragmatricCNN [37] was used
as the classifier (EEGNet, DeepCNN and ShallowCNN cannot
work on the spectrograms). Because both CSP and STFT are
differentiable operations, we can compute the gradients over
the whole pipeline to find the adversarial perturbations on the
raw EEG time series.
Fig. 9. The CNN classification pipeline on the MI dataset, when EEG
spectrogram is used as the input feature.
The within-subject white-box attack results on the MI
dataset are shown in Table VI. Clearly, the attack was very
successful, suggesting that simply extracting the spectrogram
as the input features cannot effectively defend adversarial
attacks.
TABLE VI
WITHIN-SUBJECT RCAS/BCAS BEFORE AND AFTER WHITE-BOX
ATTACKS ON PRAGMATICCNN FOR THE MI DATASET. ǫ = 0.05.
Subject Clean Examples Noisy Examples Adversarial Examples
s1 .8103/.8012 .8103/.7958 .1638/.1754
s2 .6552/.6422 .6638/.6508 .1810/.1898
s3 .8621/.8525 .8017/.8006 .1379/.1466
s4 .6810/.6781 .6724/.6722 .1983/.2023
s5 .5862/.5946 .5690/.5727 .2672/.2609
s6 .5259/.5272 .5517/.5532 .2241/.2250
s7 .8448/.8491 .8103/.8194 .1810/.1752
s8 .8448/.8328 .7759/.7568 .2414/.2535
s9 .8707/.8673 .8448/.8411 .2414/.2299
Average .7423/.7383 .7222/.7181 .2040/.2065
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper investigates the vulnerability of CNN classifiers
in EEG-based BCI systems. We generate adversarial examples
by injecting a jamming module before a CNN classifier to
fool it. Three scenarios – white-box attack, gray-box attack,
and black-box attack – were considered, and separate attack
strategies were proposed for each of them. Experiments on
three EEG datasets and three CNN classifiers demonstrated the
effectiveness of our proposed strategies, i.e., the vulnerability
of CNN classifiers in EEG-based BCIs.
Our future research will:
1) Study the vulnerability of traditional machine learning
approaches in BCIs. As shown in Section III-J, the
adversarial examples generated from CNN models may
not transfer well to traditional machine learning models,
and hence new attack strategies are needed.
2) Investigate attack strategies to other components of the
BCI machine learning model. Fig. 10 shows that attacks
can target different components of a machine learning
model. This paper only considered adversarial examples,
targeted at the test input. Attacks to the training data,
learned model parameters, and the test output, will also
be considered.
3) Study strategies to defend adversarial attacks on EEG-
based BCIs. Multiple defense approaches, e.g., adver-
sarial training [12], defensive distillation [28], ensemble
adversarial training [38], and so on [14], [22], [46],
have been proposed for other application domains. Un-
fortunately, there has not existed a universal defense
approach because it is still unclear theoretically why
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Fig. 10. Attack strategies to different components of a machine learning
model.
adversarial examples occur in deep learning. Goodfellow
et al. (2014) [12] believed that adversarial examples exist
because of the linearity of deep learning models. Gilmer
et al. (2018) [11] argued that adversarial examples occur
as a result of the high dimensional geometry of the
data manifold. We will investigate the root cause of
adversarial examples in EEG classification/regression,
and hence develop effective defense strategies for safer
BCIs.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research was supported by the National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China Grant 61873321.
REFERENCES
[1] K. K. Ang, Z. Y. Chin, H. Zhang, and C. Guan, “Filter bank common
spatial pattern (FBCSP) in brain-computer interface,” in Proc. IEEE Int’l
Joint Conf. on Neural Networks, Hong Kong, China, 2008.
[2] A. Athalye, L. Engstrom, A. Ilyas, and K. Kwok, “Synthesizing robust
adversarial examples,” in Proc. 35th Int’l Conf. on Machine Learning,
Stockholm, Sweden, Jul. 2018, pp. 284–293.
[3] A. Barachant, S. Bonnet, M. Congedo, and C. Jutten, “Multiclass
braincomputer interface classification by riemannian geometry,” IEEE
Trans. on Biomedical Engineering, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 920–928, Apr.
2012.
[4] P. Bashivan, I. Rish, M. Yeasin, and N. Codella, “Learning representa-
tions from EEG with deep recurrent-convolutional neural networks,” in
Proc. Int’l Conf. on Learning Representations, San Juan, Puerto Rico,
May 2016.
[5] W. Brendel, J. Rauber, and M. Bethge, “Decision-based adversarial
attacks: Reliable attacks against black-box machine learning models,”
in Proc. Int’l Conf. on Learning Representations, Vancouver, Canada,
May 2018.
[6] T. B. Brown, D. Mane´, A. Roy, M. Abadi, and J. Gilmer,
“Adversarial patch,” CoRR, vol. abs/1712.09665, 2017. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1712.09665
[7] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Towards evaluating the robustness of neural
networks,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. San
Jose, CA: IEEE, May 2017, pp. 39–57.
[8] N. Carlini and D. A. Wagner, “Audio adversarial examples: Targeted
attacks on speech-to-text,” CoRR, vol. abs/1801.01944, 2018. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1801.01944
[9] F. Chollet, “Xception: Deep learning with depthwise separable convolu-
tions,” in Proc. IEEE Conf. on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition.
Honolulu, HI: IEEE, Jul. 2017, pp. 1800–1807.
[10] L. Farwell and E. Donchin, “Talking off the top of your head: toward
a mental prosthesis utilizing event-related brain potentials,” Electroen-
cephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, vol. 70, no. 6, pp. 510–
523, 1988.
[11] J. Gilmer, L. Metz, F. Faghri, S. S. Schoenholz,
M. Raghu, M. Wattenberg, and I. J. Goodfellow, “Adversarial
spheres,” CoRR, vol. abs/1801.02774, 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.02774
[12] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples,” in Proc. Int’l Conf. on Learning Representations,
San Diego, CA, May 2015.
[13] B. Graimann, B. Allison, and G. Pfurtscheller, Brain-Computer Inter-
faces: A Gentle Introduction. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2009, pp.
1–27.
[14] C. Guo, M. Rana, M. Cisse´, and L. van der Maaten, “Countering adver-
sarial images using input transformations,” CoRR, vol. abs/1711.00117,
2017. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.00117
[15] U. Hoffmann, J.-M. Vesin, T. Ebrahimi, and K. Diserens, “An efficient
P300-based brain-computer interface for disabled subjects,” Journal of
Neuroscience Methods, vol. 167, no. 1, pp. 115–125, 2008.
[16] D. P. Kingma and J. Ba, “Adam: A method for stochastic optimization,”
in Proc. Int’l Conf. on Learning Representations, Banff, Canada, Apr.
2014.
[17] Z. J. Koles, M. S. Lazar, and S. Z. Zhou, “Spatial patterns underlying
population differences in the background EEG,” Brain topography,
vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 275–284, Jun. 1990.
[18] A. Kurakin, I. J. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial examples in
the physical world,” in Proc. Int’l Conf. on Learning Representations,
Toulon, France, Apr. 2017.
[19] V. J. Lawhern, A. J. Solon, N. R. Waytowich, S. M. Gordon, C. P. Hung,
and B. J. Lance, “EEGNet: a compact convolutional neural network for
EEG-based brain-computer interfaces,” Journal of Neural Engineering,
vol. 15, no. 5, p. 056013, 2018.
[20] Y. Li, J. Pan, J. Long, T. Yu, F. Wang, Z. Yu, and W. Wu, “Multimodal
BCIs: Target detection, multidimensional control, and awareness eval-
uation in patients with disorder of consciousness,” Proceedings of the
IEEE, vol. 104, no. 2, pp. 332–352, 2016.
[21] Y. Liu, X. Chen, C. Liu, and D. Song, “Delving into transferable ad-
versarial examples and black-box attacks,” CoRR, vol. abs/1611.02770,
2016. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1611.02770
[22] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and
A. Vladu, “Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial
attacks,” CoRR, vol. abs/1706.06083, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://arXiv.org/abs/1706.06083
[23] P. Margaux, M. Emmanuel, D. Sbastien, B. Olivier, and M. Jrmie,
“Objective and subjective evaluation of online error correction during
P300-based spelling,” Advances in Human-Computer Interaction, vol.
2012, no. 578295, p. 13, 2012.
[24] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard, “Deepfool: a simple
and accurate method to fool deep neural networks.” in Proc. of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. Las Vegas,
NV: IEEE, Jun. 2016, pp. 2574–2582.
[25] L. F. Nicolas-Alonso and J. Gomez-Gil, “Brain computer interfaces, a
review,” Sensors, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 1211–1279, 2012.
[26] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, and I. Goodfellow, “Transferability in
machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks using
adversarial samples,” CoRR, vol. abs/1605.07277, 2016. [Online].
Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.07277
[27] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Celik, and
A. Swami, “Practical black-box attacks against machine learning,” in
Proc. ACM Asia Conf. on Computer and Communications Security. Abu
Dhabi, UAE: ACM, Apr. 2017, pp. 506–519.
[28] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami, “Distillation
as a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks,”
in Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. San Jose, CA:
IEEE, May 2016, pp. 582–597.
[29] G. Pfurtscheller and C. Neuper, “Motor imagery and direct brain-
computer communication,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 89, no. 7,
pp. 1123–1134, Jul 2001.
[30] B. Rivet, A. Souloumiac, V. Attina, and G. Gibert, “xDAWN algorithm
to enhance evoked potentials: application to braincomputer interface,”
IEEE Trans. on Biomedical Engineering, vol. 56, no. 8, pp. 2035–2043,
Aug. 2009.
[31] R. T. Schirrmeister, J. T. Springenberg, L. D. J. Fiederer, M. Glasstetter,
K. Eggensperger, M. Tangermann, F. Hutter, W. Burgard, and T. Ball,
“Deep learning with convolutional neural networks for EEG decoding
and visualization,” Human Brain Mapping, vol. 38, no. 11, pp. 5391–
5420, 2017.
[32] J. Su, D. V. Vargas, and K. Sakurai, “One pixel attack for fooling
deep neural networks,” CoRR, vol. abs/1710.08864, 2017. [Online].
Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.08864
12
[33] S. Sutton, M. Braren, J. Zubin, and E. R. John, “Evoked-potential
correlates of stimulus uncertainty,” Science, vol. 150, no. 3700, pp.
1187–1188, 1965.
[34] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. J.
Goodfellow, and R. Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural networks,”
in Proc. Int’l Conf. on Learning Representations, Banff, Canada, Apr.
2014.
[35] Y. R. Tabar and U. Halici, “A novel deep learning approach for classifi-
cation of EEG motor imagery signals,” Journal of Neural Engineering,
vol. 14, no. 1, p. 016003, 2017.
[36] M. Tangermann, K.-R. Mller, A. Aertsen, N. Birbaumer, C. Braun,
C. Brunner, R. Leeb, C. Mehring, K. Miller, G. Mueller-Putz, G. Nolte,
G. Pfurtscheller, H. Preissl, G. Schalk, A. Schlgl, C. Vidaurre,
S. Waldert, and B. Blankertz, “Review of the BCI Competition IV,”
Frontiers in Neuroscience, vol. 6, p. 55, 2012.
[37] Z. Tayeb, J. Fedjaev, N. Ghaboosi, C. Richter, L. Everding, X. Qu,
Y. Wu, G. Cheng, and J. Conradt, “Validating deep neural networks
for online decoding of motor imagery movements from EEG signals,”
Sensors, vol. 19, no. 1, p. 210, Jan. 2019.
[38] F. Tramr, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh, and
P. McDaniel, “Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses,” in
Proc. Int’l Conf. on Learning Representations, Vancouver, Canada, May
2018.
[39] F. Tramr, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh, and
P. McDaniel, “The space of transferable adversarial examples,”
CoRR, vol. abs/1704.03453v2, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://arXiv.org/abs/1704.03453v2
[40] D. Wu, “Online and offline domain adaptation for reducing BCI cali-
bration effort,” IEEE Trans. on Human-Machine Systems, vol. 47, no. 4,
pp. 550–563, 2017.
[41] D. Wu, J.-T. King, C.-H. Chuang, C.-T. Lin, and T.-P. Jung, “Spatial
filtering for EEG-based regression problems in brain-computer interface
(BCI),” IEEE Trans. on Fuzzy Systems, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 771–781,
2018.
[42] D. Wu, V. J. Lawhern, S. Gordon, B. J. Lance, and C.-T. Lin, “Driver
drowsiness estimation from EEG signals using online weighted adap-
tation regularization for regression (OwARR),” IEEE Trans. on Fuzzy
Systems, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 1522–1535, 2017.
[43] D. Wu, V. J. Lawhern, W. D. Hairston, and B. J. Lance, “Switching
EEG headsets made easy: Reducing offline calibration effort using active
weighted adaptation regularization,” IEEE Trans. on Neural Systems and
Rehabilitation Engineering, vol. 24, no. 11, pp. 1125–1137, 2016.
[44] D. Wu, V. J. Lawhern, B. J. Lance, S. Gordon, T.-P. Jung, and C.-
T. Lin, “EEG-based user reaction time estimation using Riemannian
geometry features,” IEEE Trans. on Neural Systems and Rehabilitation
Engineering, vol. 25, no. 11, pp. 2157–2168, 2017.
[45] L. Wu, Z. Zhu, C. Tai, and W. E, “Understanding and enhancing the
transferability of adversarial examples,” CoRR, vol. abs/1802.09707,
2018. [Online]. Available: http://arXiv.org/abs/1802.09707
[46] C. Xie, J. Wang, Z. Zhang, Z. Ren, and A. Yuille, “Mitigating adver-
sarial effects through randomization,” in Proc. Int’l Conf. on Learning
Representations, Vancouver, Canada, May 2018.
[47] D. Zhu, J. Bieger, G. Garcia Molina, and R. M. Aarts, “A survey
of stimulation methods used in SSVEP-based BCIs,” Computational
Intelligence and Neuroscience, p. 702357, 2010.
